The Leading in a Crisis Podcast
What really happens when a crisis hits an organization—and how technology is influencing decisions and reputation impacts. Come hear what happened when experienced leaders were actually in the middle of a crisis—and capture the lessons before it happens to you. Email the show at Tom@leadinginacrisis.com.
Your host, Tom Mueller, is a veteran crisis manager and trainer with more than 30 years in the corporate communications and crisis fields. Tom currently works as an executive coach and crisis trainer with WPNT Communications, and as a contract public information officer and trainer through his personal company, Tom Mueller Communications LLC.
Our goal is to help you grow your knowledge and awareness so you can be better prepared to lead should a major crisis threaten your organization.
Music credit: Special thanks to Nick Longoria from Austin, Texas for creating the theme music for the podcast.
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#CrisisResponse #management #leadership
The Leading in a Crisis Podcast
When skyscrapers fall - FDNY tackles the Big One on 911
Use Left/Right to seek, Home/End to jump to start or end. Hold shift to jump forward or backward.
We talk with Paul Brown, Gregory Shea, and Andre Kotze about how the FDNY kept operating at Ground Zero after losing 343 firefighters and why action, trust, and shared mission mattered before any “perfect” command structure could. We also dig into the difference between an emergency and a true organizational crisis, plus how outside incident management experts helped close dangerous gaps over time.
• immediate action at the scene and why there is no huddle
• how relationships and shared training create resilience under pressure
• what a leadership vacuum looks like and how junior officers step up
• the difference between emergency response and a crisis that erodes capability
• why safety leadership and risk control become essential after the first push
• “Whatever your job was yesterday” and role flexibility under strain
• how incident management support from the wildfire community gains trust
• the radio logistics story and what credibility looks like in practice
Please join us for that next episode to get the thrilling conclusion to this really interesting conversation
#risingfromgroundzero #resilience #911response #ptsd #recovery #crisiscomms #emergencymanagement #FDNY
We'd love to hear from you. Email the show at Tom@leadinginacrisis.com.
Guests And Book Set Up
Tom MuellerHey everyone and welcome back to the Leading in a Crisis Podcast. I'm Tom Mueller. Thanks for joining us again this week. If you'd like to email the show, you can drop me a line at Tom at LeadingInAcrisis.com. On our show this week, I'm very honored to have as one of three guests today, Paul Brown, who is a former New York City fire captain and educator. Paul was on the ground on September 11, 2001, when the terror attacks hit the city of New York and the World Trade Center towers, and uh had some really fascinating experiences to share from his time uh in the department helping to manage that response. And then what came after it in the months and years later. Now, Paul is just one of three guests we have on today. Our second guest is Gregory Shea. Now, Gregory is a senior fellow at the Wharton Center for Leadership and Change Management at the University of Pennsylvania, and uh he's a published author. And you can find his bylines in numerous national publications as well. And our third guest is Andre Kotzi, uh, who's the CEO of a company called Airtime BA and an executive coach with more than three decades of experience. Uh I think we'll recognize Andre's voice because he's a South African and a veteran of the South African Defense Force and also a former mountain rescue operator. So he works with global organizations like the World Economic Forum and Wharton School. Together, these three gentlemen have come together in a labor of love over the last nine years or so and written a book, and it's called Rising from Ground Zero, 9-11 and the FDNY's Path Through Crisis to Transformation. It's a fascinating read, uh, and I highly recommend it. Gentlemen, welcome to the podcast. Thanks for having us. I found the book just a fascinating read, uh, mainly because of the way you've structured it. And you can tell there's just so many hours work have gone into this in interviewing firefighters who were on the scene and leaders who were on the scene that day and in the ensuing months and years, capturing their oral histories in short and concise bytes, but then pulling the lens back on all of that and giving us some very critical management lessons and lessons learned that have come from that. And those lessons are applicable to leaders in any organization that might be going through a tough time or a major crisis. So uh congratulations to you all for writing this book. I know it took a lot of time and effort, and just from you know, one podcaster, thanks for doing it, and it's a terrific project.
The FDNY Moves Without Hesitation
Tom MuellerHey, Paul, can I start with you? I I wanted to just take you back for a minute to that day when the the attacks are happening or they've happened now, and firefighters are rushing in to do what they do, which is those heroic rescues and getting the situation under control. And then the buildings collapse. And within the span of a few minutes or an hour, you lose 343 firefighters, 343 of your colleagues there. Uh that would have crushed most teams. How did how did your team, how did the fire department carry on from that and get organized to continue this critical response that needed to happen?
Paul BrownUh I think I think what happened is when something like that happens, such an outsized incident, you can't prepare for it in the moment. The FDNY spent 136 years preparing for that moment among thousands of other moments of lesser significance that happened during its history. So there's a lot of things that you hear. There's an assumed uh assumed thought that there was some sort of paralysis, that it took time to get organized, that we had well, that's not how the FDNY operates, and it's not how it has ever operated, and it's not actually what happened at the World Trade Center. The FDNY doesn't pull up in an emergency and have a huddle. The rig stops, we jump off, we go to work immediately. We don't wait for orders, we don't wait for command instructions. We know how to handle fires, we know how to handle emergencies, we know how to handle building collapses. Everybody goes to work immediately. The World Trade Center happens, those that survived the collapse dusted themselves off, found a place of safety during the collapse, they immediately turned around and went right back in. No awaiting instructions, no awaiting command, no awaiting direction. In small bits, in ones and twos, in fives and twelves, groups of firefighters got together and started the work while at the same time the upper levels of command tried to get overall command and control over the incident. And slowly from the bottom and from the top, two met in the middle.
Tom MuellerAnd what are the sort of broader lessons that you've taken away from you know from the those early moments there? I know I want to a little bit later on talk about transformation. Um, but is what what were some of the initial sort of reactions and changes that were made in the department once you had a chance to stand back and take a look at what happened here?
Paul BrownWell, there were a lot of changes later on through the months, years, and and decades uh later on, but uh I think initially within uh the first few days was a realization that although this was a fire and a collapse within the department's expertise, it was the scale that was different. And as far as how we address that, uh I think Andre and Greg could actually speak a little bit more about that.
Prof Gregory SheaOne of the things that's striking as a as a lay person on this is the the depth of preparation, as Paul was saying, de facto. Uh when you have uh a select group of people, this is a highly competitive force, they have lots of experience, they rotate people so they work together, they have a depth plan fully of experience and comradeship. Anyone who's eaten in a firehouse
Trust, Training, And Shared Mission
Prof Gregory Sheaknows this is not a casual event that happens in a firehouse at any meal, right? And that's who's ever sitting at that table is not a casual event, and it was not casually prepared food. Um, and there they the work on the on therefore both the personal and the professional relationships and the depth of those things. And we know that when organizations are pummeled, you gotta fall back on the individuals, but you also have to fall back on the relationships. And so whether these people were working with people they worked with every day or they simply knew somebody who they worked with every day, uh, they knew they shared training, they shared the mission, they they shared experience. And so out of the dust, they could do that. And so, in that sense, as Paul said, they were they were preparing for this long before this happened and that clarity of mission, but it's also, and I would pull one other thing out of what Paul said, it's the sense of the meaning of what you're doing. These are people who have chosen to do this work, and they're chosen uh you know a couple thousand out of every 50,000 applicants, right? And they are dedicated to doing this work and they define themselves in terms of this work. So they feel able and they feel dedicated. Now, if you wanted two kind of meta-level ingredients to go into a crisis, those would be two in combination with extended working relationships and common training. Uh I don't know that you can prepare much better for something than that when you can't know exactly what you're preparing for.
Tom MuellerWell, when we talk about leadership skills, leadership training, right? You had a good hierarchical situation there within the F within the fire department. And one of the things that struck me is that you lost some of those leaders early on in that. And Paul, as you just mentioned, you know, firefighters got in there and carried on. But did you feel that sort of that leadership vacuum? Um, did that take some time to adjust to, or did everybody just kick into gear and keep rolling?
Paul BrownI think everybody just reacted to what they were faced with. When when I arrived uh post-collapse, uh I ended up in an area where there turned out uh there were very few people operating in the moment that I arrived in that area, and I got there, and almost immediately, I was a very young lieutenant, and in individually and in groups, I I had dozens and dozens of firefighters come up to me within the span of about 40 minutes asking what needed to be done. Um you know, and it was uh a number of people that probably would normally have been supervised by a deputy chief, and they were coming to a relatively junior company officer. So everybody just confronted what was in front of them. They took care of what they could in the area where they were, and that happened hundreds, if not thousands of times in different locations.
Tom MuellerWell, you've given a good example here, Paul, of uh the junior level officers stepping up and filling the vacuum there, right? And the group was, you know, the teams are naturally looking to who's in charge now and you know what do we do. And then that requires people to step up and take leadership, um, and or not, right? Not everybody might feel comfortable doing that. But from the lessons I've taken away from your book, though, you saw that uh in spades. You saw people who were there stepping up, leading the teams organizing, and moving ahead with that.
Emergency Versus Crisis
Andre KotzeI I almost want to take a step back, Tom. Um, and uh from our brief chat uh before the podcast started, uh you you were at Deep Water Horizon, uh, certainly part of the response there. Um I worked for BP for many uh many years. That's how I got my my start in my uh profession. Um I would consider them to be uh one of the best run organizations that I've ever had the privilege of working for. Um I just want to draw a distinction between emergency and crisis. So um to Paul's point, uh FDNY have been putting out fires for 130 years. Um any one of those fires, uh yes, they were big, uh, but it's nothing they hadn't seen before. They had seen buildings collapse, they had seen uh loss of their brothers and sisters, they had everything that that uh event dished up they had experienced before. Um to my mind, and uh uh other people might have a a different definition here, but when something becomes a crisis is when the event uh eats away at the organization itself, eats away at your ability to respond to what's unfolding. Um now uh uh that scale takes on um an energy and an agency of its own. Um so the the response we might have this fantasy that the response is somehow organized by leaders. Um in my experience it's not. Um it is pure action-reaction. Um something happens, uh, that thing is gonna roll over you or it's not. Um if it's not gonna roll over you, you're gonna deal with the thing that's rolling over you. Uh in those moments, the situation is in command.
Tom MuellerAnd um uh well, Andre, does that come back to training then? Of having people who are trained, know their jobs, maybe inter trained with other roles in the organization? You know, we're talking about an incident management team working under incident command system here, which was not in place at the fire department uh at the time 9-11 hit, which was a fascinating thing for me to learn here. But is is training a key part of what you're talking about there then? The organization is prime to get into action.
Andre KotzeWell, I'm kind of drawing a line under what Greg was saying, just by way of importance, because uh sometimes these things can go by us. You can hear something profound and not really understand how profound it is. From a capability standpoint, um, uh we would look at people, process, and technology. Uh, some cape some combination of those things produces our capability to respond. Um so training is one element of that. Um, and we would say that that uh fits into process. And um uh that that's an interesting theme here because um many of the operating procedures were that's not useful. Like if you don't have water pressure, um like all of your procedures for bringing water to the fire, um you know, that then becomes a challenge. So there were versions of this uh that were reverberating through people, through process, and through technology. Technology, I'd say it's the equipment, all of the fire engines, uh all of that stuff that they had assembled around uh uh the event itself. But the gaps that are filled by leadership, um, they appear over time. They're not immediately visible. Uh everybody is responding to stay alive, responding to save the person next to them, responding to deal with a situation that is the boss. And then after some period of time, um, when we begin to get distanced from the moment, the gaps start appearing. And that's when leadership really matters. And uh I think Greg is gonna be in a good spot to give you a sense of how that leadership uh began to fill in over time. Um and um uh and then of course there was the long-term version of that that Paul is gonna be really well equipped uh to fill you in on, which is to your point about the transformation where we saw the incident management teams come online. But I just wanted to take a step back and say, you know, this is not something clinical that's rolling out in a nice, neat, orderly uh manner according to some leaders' plan. Um uh it's an effing mess, and um uh it's it's people uh doing what's in front of them, and then only over time do we see uh the impact of leadership come in to close those gaps that begin uh to form. Uh Greg?
Prof Gregory SheaWell, Tom, and Andre, I was gonna um add that uh this it's it's not you can train people, but but unless they're deeply trusting that we're in this together for the mission, we know what the mission looks like on the ground, we know we can trust the other people who are gonna be doing this, even if I can't see them right now, literally cannot see them right now. Um we don't have those things, I don't care if you trained them or not, they're not gonna do it. Right? So one of the one of the one of the writers that we draw on, Eric Chris, talks about as as cognitive and as environmentally scanning as Eric was, he said, you know, when it comes down to it, you get into these kinds of environments, it's about the individual and the relationships. That's what's gonna get you through this. And I think as a rough analogy, you know, when the American troops got got blitzed in the Battle of the Bulged, they knew what had happened to them. They were in pieces, they were spread out across the the terrain, but they'd been doing this to other people for several years by that point. They knew what had happened, and even at the squad level, they knew the best thing we can do is not retreat, the best thing we can do is screw up what they're doing, because that'll make it easier for the people who they're trying to blitz further to get to us. So at both a at a very tactical level as well as at, in effect, a strategic level, they knew how to deal with this crisis of being enveloped by um by a powerful force. And I think that has a rough analogy to this in that it's they knew training, they knew other people knew what to do, they were looking for other people to align with. It was kind of like the Terminator II Mercury on the ground from a broken thermos uh thermometer. They were gonna start drawing themselves together uh to deal with this overwhelming event. But right now, mission and tactics come down to what I handle right in front of me with the person I'm gonna find, whoever that person is that's on the ground with me.
From Tactical Work To Safety
Tom MuellerOkay, well, it clearly, I mean, there's a resilience here, there's a relying on relationships to get things done, to keep things moving. Paul, did you want to add anything on top of that?
Paul BrownUh you know, I think as far as we discussed the day or the first couple of days, for for the most part, it was all tactical. It was uh, you know, people with hands-on tools doing the work that's in front of them.
Tom MuellerRight.
Paul BrownThen slowly the upper levels came down and they assumed a role, a safety role. And much of their safety role uh in the beginning parts of the incident, well, and later on as well, were to save us from ourselves. From saving us from overextending, taking unnecessary uh, you know, risks. And that was the first thing that the upper levels of command uh pushed downward on on the troops. As far as when things got strategic, it came later. It was it was it was days if if not a week later. It was still a matter of uh of uh you know just putting band-aids on whatever you saw in the immediate. And then the department got organized a few days later, they formed the World Trade Center Task Force, uh, they organized how people responded in, they began tracking what areas you know were were searched and became much more strategic. And then finally, um the incident management folks you know from the wildfire community came in and showed us how they do it and what equipment and supplies and tools to organize they had. And that was uh uh an entirely separate process from what happened initially.
Tom MuellerOkay, and I
Whatever Your Job Was Yesterday
Tom Muellerwant to get to that in just a moment. The the the way the incident management team structure was kind of rolled in after the fact. But one of the tenants uh that comes through in the book is um it's a quote from from somebody then it says, Whatever your job was yesterday. It's not your job today. And that just struck me so hard because first of all, somebody has to say that to you, right? Somebody in authority. But then we as responders have to be ready to step into roles that maybe isn't what we initially trained for. So tell me a little bit about what's the significance of that.
Paul BrownSo that was Deputy Commissioner Tom Fitzpatrick. And it's what he said the following morning when he arrived back at headquarters. And he was letting the folks know in headquarters that whatever their job was that day or previously, it was no longer their job, and it wasn't going to be their job that day, that they were going to be part of assisting and facilitating the firefighters who were on the scene of the incident.
Tom MuellerRight. And this was still a scene where you had hundreds of missing people who were trapped somewhere in the collapsed buildings. And so firefighters every day, 12 hours a day, are in there digging, looking for people, hoping to pull out not only their fellow firefighters, but others who were working in the buildings. So that would have been, you know, that day-to-day focus then. And um yeah, it's just an amazing and sort of heart-wrenching kind of story there.
Prof Gregory SheaBut I was just gonna add something about this. Your job changing one of the one of the mini scenes that we talked about is um somebody being charged, one of the uh firefighters being charged with getting heavy equipment or getting a fence. There's no fence around this thing, right? And this is not something that that one would normally do is I'm gonna go find construction equipment. And he said, he basically came back and forth a couple of times with the more senior officer, and finally the senior officer senior officer said, It's yours, just don't screw it up. So everybody knows you don't know how to do this. I don't know how to do it, but you got it, right? So just don't make a mess of it and go do the best you can do and get all the equipment we need to clean out 220 stories of rubble while we're looking for our our brothers and who are missing and our sisters who are missing, and uh the police officers, the port authority people, the thousands of civilians. Uh but take this, just don't screw it up. Right.
Tom MuellerAnd that's pretty clear direction eventually, but a fairly wide discretion. Boss, that's not my job. Okay. We know. Go do it anyway. That's right. Get it done. Great point there, uh, Greg. Thanks for that. Um so let me take you back to the uh the incident management team uh coming in, because
How ICS Reaches The FDNY
Tom Muellerthis is um uh just surprise me because it's so common today that you you know you stand up and IMT whenever there's a major incident, right? And I've been schooled my entire career in oil and gas on how to do that and what roles to fill and how they interact together and how we get it all done. Um, but early on, now that wasn't the case with the fire department of New York. So, how did that um come into play? How did the incident management system um get started in there?
Paul BrownUm You know, there's there's uh a little bit of a backstory before that. So the FDNY is such a massive organization, you know, largest fire department in the U.S., three times larger than the second largest, which is Chicago. Uh 136 years of handling millions of fires and emergencies, never had an incident come up that we couldn't handle or simply just rotate people in and out of as needed. Never had a need for logistics or support. People need to eat, send them back to the firehouse, bring more people in. And that's what we did for 136 years, and it worked until it didn't. And then what we often say is that uh in 2001 the FDNY couldn't spell ICS. Like I think some people were roughly aware that it was a thing, it was something they did at these fires out west. But we had no comprehension that there could be any applicability for what we did in an urban environment. We didn't know what logistics and supplies that they actually had access to, or how efficient that and and well practiced and well-oiled that system was. And uh, you know, the the way they actually had to find a way to let the FDNY know that they could help us. And there's in the book, there's we we devote entire chapter to it. Yeah, and uh Andre, you want you want to tell a story about how they got in the door?
Andre KotzeUh I might be thinking of a different story, Paul, um of what you have on in mind. Uh the observation.
Prof Gregory SheaSo I can uh give Andre a moment so he can he can add whatever I leave out. Um so um the
Radios, Credibility, And Real Support
Prof Gregory Sheathe the folks from the forestry department, or as they were not initially belovedly labeled, but subsequently were belovedly labeled, the tree people. And they were called the tree people not just because they were from the forestry service department, but also because um on their left shoulder they had a tree, they had a tree patch, right? In case you missed the fact that they were from the forestry department. Uh so um they they're used to when they come in, they take over. Um they run the show once they show up. Um because it's it's in command. I mean, they you know, whether it's whatever the disaster is, this is what they do. They show up, they got a structure, and they put it in place. Well, uh you might imagine that didn't go that well with the FDNY. Um A, because it's the FDNY, B, in case you didn't notice it's New York. Uh, and then um C, uh these this is this is this is they're still looking for they're still looking for their own people, as well as civilians, as well as police officers, and there are fires burning there. There will be fires burning there for three months. So it's a fire site, right? So they the the forestry folks were smart. They stepped back and they watched. And even though they they were they had actually been mobilized before noon on the 11th of September, they were mobilized to get there uh because they knew they'd be needed. But we're gonna step back. So uh as Paul's referencing, then there's a there they work the network a little bit, they get a location in the building that's headquarters uh uh for what the FDNY is doing. They work a mutual contact, so they end up with an exchange um uh with Pete Hayden, who's the assistant incident commander at that time. Uh, and um basically the conversation goes uh what do you need? I need radios. Uh how many hundreds when? Two days would be good. All right. They're gone, and by in less than two days, by the following afternoon, there are 450 operating radio radios with batteries, with chargers, two um two repeaters, one on top of the Empire State Building, one on top of uh of a uh um uh a museum uh aircraft carrier in in the Hudson Bay. Uh, and that's what they got, right? One might say the problem solved. Uh so uh you can imagine what the next question is uh from Hayden is what else you got, right? Well, the next thing they got is instant command.
Tom MuellerCan we pause, Greg, just a moment and say thank you to the logistics section for making that happen? It's unbelievable. Okay.
Prof Gregory SheaSo so in terms of credibility, and and now what we're here to establish a helping relationship. We're not here to take over. It's your site. We will help you. That's an that's a very different way for the foresty folks to operate. And the fire department is responsive to that. And they will be heavily influenced, not just about radios, but about the incident command process, which we can talk more about. Andre may pick it up from here. Uh, and and that becomes a major change in terms of how they think about themselves, their competency, uh, being an all-hazards department, but it turns on both groups making an adjustment to end up in an effective and long-lasting helping relationship.
Andre KotzeTom, the thing uh that I was uh trying to rack my slow-moving mind around at the uh time of the asking of your question. Um, Paul, correct me or not. Did FDNY not have a native uh incident management capability not equivalent to the IMTs? Um, but uh I seem to recall that they had some native capability. Is that correct? No, not okay.
Prof Gregory SheaThey took a stab at it. They've been operating for a couple of days.
Paul BrownA slightly bigger fire gets a deputy
Why Capability Maturity Matters
Paul Brownchief, an even bigger fire gets a deputy assistant chief, and then so on and so on until the chief of department is there. Now, at the World Trade Center, if this is what you're asking, on the Friday after they removed several chiefs and created the World Trade Center task force, and those chiefs were only in charge of the World Trade Center and not in charge of their whatever their day job was in headquarters, so they were taken as a separate entity. That actually was the first attempt at incident management, but we had no experience doing it that way. And the other thing was the radios is a great story. Um they were sitting in a warehouse in Maryland and they were just ordered up with a phone call. We had no idea that system existed, we had no idea that these caches of equipment and supplies were there for the asking, and uh, and and and it took the tree people to teach us that.
Prof Gregory SheaSo there's a great quote from the guy who was the instant commander, Cruthers, who said, if you had told me on September 10th um that one of the most valuable resources we'd have would be from the forestry department, I would have had you committed on the spot. But today, I can only say, thank God they were here.
Tom MuellerYeah. It's a fascinating story because they essentially set up a little bit of a parallel response organization there that was able then to start networking in with the fire department and then over time probably melded closer and closer to supporting each other that way. So yeah, fascinating that the Forest Service brought that in, but that probably you know goes back to the firefighting history and and all of that, the the birth of the incident command system there. Uh Andre, did you do you uh have something else to add there?
Andre KotzeYeah, yeah. Um so uh just to your point earlier about training, uh, we had some very senior, very skilled people that came up during the war years um uh in uh in New York. And without the training, without the network, without the knowledge of what resources are available, um, they they didn't have the capability. So even though the will was there, the resources were there, the people were dedicated, their ability to actually do what the incident management teams can do, um, it was not mature.
Tom MuellerOkay, in the interest of time, we're gonna pause our conversation here with Greg, Paul, and Andre, and we will conclude the interview in our next episode, which will already be posted. So please join us for that next episode to get the thrilling conclusion to this really interesting conversation. And that's gonna do it for this episode of the Leading in a Crisis Podcast. So thanks for joining us, and we'll see you on the next episode.