Welcome And Guest Introduction

Tom Mueller 0:06

Hi everyone, and welcome back to the Leading a Crisis Podcast. We're happy to have you with us today. On this podcast, we share stories from the front lines of crisis management through interviews, storytelling, and lessons learned shared by experienced crisis leaders. I'm Tom Mueller. With me today, my co-host again, Mark Mullen. Mark, welcome.

Marc Mullen 0:28

I'm looking for our time together today.

Tom Mueller 0:32

Today we are venturing to England to talk with the highly experienced crisis leader, Amanda Coleman. Amanda fits right in on this podcast, and she is a crisis communication specialist just like Mark and myself. Amanda is also a published author with two books to her credit on communications and crisis communications. And today she runs her own consultancy, Amanda Coleman Consultancy Limited, which is based in England. Amanda started her career as a journalist before joining the Greater Manchester Police as a public information officer. And it's the context of that role with Greater Manchester Police that we're going to talk to Amanda today. Amanda, welcome to the show.

Amanda Coleman 1:21

Thank you for inviting me. I'm looking forward to it.

Recounting The Manchester Arena Attack

Tom Mueller 1:24

Hey, we appreciate you taking the time, and I know we're going to have a great conversation. Now, for our listeners, I want to take you back to 2017. Ariana Grande had just concluded a concert at the Manchester Arena in England, a full concert with thousands of participants and attendees there. Suddenly, as the concert was letting out, an explosion rocked the arena. A suicide bomber had detonated a backpack bomb in a hallway just as concertgoers were departing the show. The explosion left dozens of people dead or seriously injured. Amanda, she was on duty that night for the Greater Manchester Police and spent the next several weeks working this crisis. Amanda, I it's hard to put into words how how crazy that night must have been for you, but I wonder if you could start off by just walking us through those first hours of the incident and where were you when you got the call?

The First Call And First Hours

Amanda Coleman 2:32

Yeah, so I actually um wasn't on call such. Um we had an on-call press officer at the time um who called me probably only 10 minutes after it had happened to say um that we were aware there's an explosion at the arena. Um and we had very limited information at that point. Um and we agreed a line that we would put out on social media. Um and luckily, because we'd done the planning work, we were able to do that without having to get it approved because it was just some basic information about an incident um and to keep away from the area. Um I did my usual when those sorts of things happened, um, went on social media um put on the uh kind of rolling news, and there was lots of confusion about what it could be um at that point. So, but I suppose at that point I'd done you know, something like 17 years in police uh communication, and I just had the feeling that it was going to be something quite significant. So I then got ready to go into work. That was about sort of half ten at night, um and then didn't get home until sort of probably about one o'clock the next afternoon. Um as we were I was travelling into work, it was only a short drive, um, we got the update about the fact that it was uh a bomb and that people were uh were had been killed. So you got that, you know, we knew that it was then gonna be a really significant job. We'd planned for those things, you know. They'd everybody remember saw that 2017, there'd been incidents in London, been incidents in Europe. So we were sort of had done some preparation work, only it had been for a uh marauding firearms type of terrorist attack and not uh for what we ended up experiencing. Um and it's strangely when you said there was so much going on and it was very um there was just it was kind of frantic, I suppose, in one sense in terms of so much activity. But you kind of slip into a sort of calm of right, we know what we need to do. Um and yeah, so so probably the initial moments I was probably at my sort of calmest, I suppose, um, because you slip into kind of the you know what you need to do and you do and you start to do it.

Tom Mueller 5:03

You sort of slip on the armor of crisis and just jump in and get working. Um how was uh how was it sort of gathering information? Because I assume you were located at the Manchester police headquarters, but the incident site would have been, you know, some distance away at the arena. So how was how were you able to gather facts and and put together statements?

Amanda Coleman 5:26

Yeah, I mean, the good thing is because of the way um it kind of works in terms of emergency response, um, we all um at a strategic level sit together. So there was representatives from all kind of the C kind of major organizations involved. Um, I went immediately to to the police headquarters where that control room was was based, and you are getting information relayed back all the time. So you you you know you have the most up-to-date information, um recognising there's gonna be big gaps because with something like that, there's inevitably gonna be huge gaps in information as as you know more details start to cut to emerge. Um, and it also gives you the um access to senior officers to be able to get things approved um and information out as quickly as possible. And I think that was the biggest kind of focus for for us that night was because it had happened at sort of half past 10 at night, you know, there's lots of people that would be going to bed, getting up, and suddenly hearing the news and wondering where people were and that kind of thing. So, you know, our focus overnight was really about trying to make sure anybody who was concerned had somewhere to go, had the most up-to-date information and could could dip try and deal with any kind of urgent actions that they needed to, um because of you know, because of the nature of it. Um, but yeah, and and really, I was gonna say the the head police headquarters is probably only about 15 minutes drive from the arena. It's quite a small, I mean it's I think this is why Manchester and the response were slightly different to other places, in that it's it's Manchester's quite a a small and um I don't know if uh it's very different to London. London, you get lots of international travellers. You do get international people to Manchester, but not in the same way. So I think that's why sometimes what we did would have been was different to what would what was happened in other capital cities, um, because it's much more of a community feel, I think, to to where we were.

Tom Mueller 7:34

Well, we'll we'll talk about the escalation of this here in just a moment, because uh clearly with the terrorist attack, you've got a national emergency on your hands, and uh you know the whole of government would be engaged in responding. Um, but at this point, you're just on the at the control center. I wonder, can you paint us a little picture of what that control center activity was like? Are you hearing uh you know radio broadcasts coming in from the scene? Is it noisy, busy, or is it very quiet stayed?

Amanda Coleman 8:11

Um it was just sort of I I I was gonna say it was it was busy, but I wouldn't say necessarily kind of frantic noisy. Um there was a small room to the side where there would be meetings happening every hour and and more frequently if needed. Um so you'd be constantly being pulled into different meetings. Um the rest of the room um is divided into different agencies, sort of desks. So you would have like the transport infrastructure, there would be a kind of senior person at a desk there, the same for um for you know, kind of the other services and responders. Um so there's lots of activity, lots of people obviously tactically trying to deal with things, um, a bank of video screens um which were relaying CCTV and any images and things that that people could get from from whatever uh sources we had um at that time. Um and the challenges and one of the challenges I had was that that that was on uh one of the floors in the building, and about three floors lower down was where the communications kind of room was where we all were usually based. So I we had to kind of keep relaying um information upwards and downwards between the floors, which sounds dead easy. But actually, when you're in that sort of uh environment is is much harder, you know, because you can't just go, oh I'm just gonna nip downstairs and go down in the left. By the time you've done that and come back, you've probably lost 20 minutes and you haven't got that time. So there was lots of kind of um emails and messages and and quick phone calls, and um which which was difficult for me because I felt like I was leaving the small team that were dealing with the media inquiries and trying to manage what was happening um in terms of questions and things that were being asked. I kind of felt like sometimes I left had to leave them because they were fronting that as much as they could, and I was trying to provide the strategic kind of lead and information to them. So yeah, so it's I mean it's always massively challenging, I think, with the information flows. Um and as the time not particularly on that night, but as things developed, we as you said, there was like national issues um and local issues. So we would have what we call rolling logs that um would be kind of updated information. Um, and there was one for government departments, there was one for national counterterrorism policing, there was one for general policing because there was a lot of firearms officers out and about in the aftermath of it in the f in the days that followed, um, as well as ones that we would have with other um public sector communicators. So very quickly my inbox was getting would get clogged all the time, like literally all the time, because we were only allowed a certain amount of uh uh of space on your email. And um and it was incredibly frustrating. And when I do work now, I'm forever saying to people it's those little things that will make your job a lot harder, and they seem insignificant when we're talking now, like you know, about something as serious as that, but actually they become a real disabler to getting information and to dealing with things and to getting decisions made and to doing things. So yeah, I always think we have to plan for the big stuff so you can sweat the small stuff, and the small stuff is you know, just find an easy way of sharing information that's not gonna keep being a a continued problem. Um as time went on, we ended up going back to uh um using a whiteboard um for lots of things because it was just easier. We were all in the same sort of location coming in on different shifts. So it was a lot easier to then go, that's that's all the latest information on the board over there. Um and we'll keep that up to date um in lieu of kind of all the problems with with email chains. So yeah, it's um but the the room itself, as I say, busy um uh and just and a lot of activity between different agencies trying to coordinate the response.

Marc Mullen 12:19

Okay, so you had your communications room three floors down from the what we would call the command center. Um, and you had information, it sounds like you had information coming into your room from all over. Was that through emails and phone calls, or were people dropping in, or how were you handling the need of the public to know? Were they able to reach directly to you?

Amanda Coleman 12:44

Yeah, um your information was coming from just a whole range of things. There were people coming in with updates for from their activity and from what they'd done. There was inf email in email information that was coming in, there was text messages from, you know, there was it was literally every channel there was information coming in. Um, I think what the what we aimed to do was um put out as much information as we possibly could that we knew was factually accurate. So we tried to use social media and and the media as time went on um to get as much information out as we possibly could to correct any inaccuracies and also to deal with the lots of kind of overnight because of what happened. There was lots of concerns if people had seen police activity in an area or you know they'd seen a a bag. Remember, um, there was a homeless person who um there was there was a pile of kind of bags, and they was, you know, that had to that would become a massive issue. So there was we had to deal with all that and try and get as swift a response as we possibly could. So there was lots of, you know, we found this out, check it out, make sure we knew the detail and get back to, you know, get something out about it as quickly as possible. Um and the speed, I think, you know, it's it just gets it gets faster and faster, doesn't it? I mean, you've literally got split seconds to be able to keep going, let's check this, let's get that. Um, and and that was very much kind of just the total focus was get as much proactively out as we could and deal with all the queries that were coming in. I mean, the other really useful thing that I always think we kind of forget is that all that information coming in in terms of questions from them from the journalists or from other sources or from people on social media can be incredibly beneficial and useful as part of the operational response because you know you can get um details of where people are concerned or if this something happened, or so I always, you know, so it's it's it's a definitely the kind of two-way um flow of information, but but very challenging to manage because you just get it through so many different um so many different places.

Tom Mueller 14:46

How was your how was your approval process for getting statements um delivered and approved and you know, and sort of the chaos of that? And you have an established procedure for that, I would assume. Did that change or was it more difficult in this environment?

Amanda Coleman 15:05

Yeah, it was difficult. Um and like we were saying, because of the national interest, because of the kind of political interest, because of the kind of four, there's a certain formula kind of approach that has to happen with any terrorist incident. So you can't call it a terrorist incident until it's got home secretary approval, etc. etc. So some of that became a real challenge. In terms of work we'd already done, we had uh the ability to do the initial um couple of line, you know, we know there's an incident without any approval because we had that delegated authority, that was really important. And then the governance was very much through what we call like the gold commander. So the person, you know, the senior police officer who was in charge. Um, and because we were literally sat virtually kind of, you know, a few couple of seats away, you can go, okay, we need to say this now. Um when we did we did two media statements um on camera at about three o'clock in the morning and then seven o'clock in the morning. Um, and those were with the chief constable. So, you know, pulling those together was challenging because we had to go, what do we, what do we want to say, what do we need to say, what are the things that people are concerned about, along with recognising that you've got a big police investigation that's going to happen, and there's certain things at some point they're gonna want to put out around what people seen and heard and what information do people have. But the balance for us was very different, suppose, than we'd even planned for. Um, whenever we'd done any any kind of serious incidents, it'd always been what do we what do we need in terms of the investigation? And that's what we would primarily be focused on. You know, have you seen this? Do you understand what you know what was the leading up to the incident? With this, we it became very much focused on the people who were caught up in it. As you mentioned at the start, you know, there was 22 people who went to the concert and never came home. And we we knew that that their families would be trying to find out about them, then they would be getting terrible news, and and and for us, that became the focus of recognizing that and recognising the support that they needed and the things that they would need to know, and the things that their kind of loved ones and family and friends and uh would need to know. The police element of it kind of took a bit of a secondary position. Um, and that that stayed with us right the way through um and became probably one of the biggest aspects of the communications response.

Tom Mueller 17:37

Yeah, I I I just can't imagine sort of taking those phone calls from a distressed parent, um, you know, looking for a child or a spouse or that. So uh how did you guys manage that then? Uh and was that police responsibility to sort of set up a hotline for people to call in to try and track down their loved ones? Talk us through that very delicate piece of this operation.

Family Support Becomes The Strategy

Amanda Coleman 18:05

Yeah, I mean, that was a big challenge because there is a standard process for setting up uh um an emergency hotline number. Um, and the company responsible for doing that um weren't able to respond quickly enough. So there was a massive challenge. They did apologize at the public inquiry. They they apologised a number of times that they were slow to respond. So it ended up being um we had to put a kind of sticking plaster to to because we knew we needed to get that number out there. So we ended up having a police number rather than a specific setup number. We had to utilize one of the existing kind of office numbers um with the people who were trained to staff um the the um casualty bureau as as it's kind of termed. And then at some point, uh which I can't quite remember exactly when it was, but it it was certainly not overnight and into the next day, um, it it became a a different number because that process kicked in. But it just shows, you know, even with something that's so such a core part of any kind of crisis response, and that happens all the time, and never's in the crisis, you can't ever rely that it will work perfectly because it it didn't in this case, and um, you know, we had to find a workaround because as you said, that was one of the most critical things, and it was really difficult for us. We were waiting for, you know, did get the details to get the information of who we thought the the kind of people who who had died were. You were seeing people being interviewed, um, who were you know, family who were trying to find their loved ones, and it's it is really difficult. There's a huge amount of kind of emotional roller coaster around it, just as even as a responder and and kind of doing the communication kind of work. Which but I suppose on one level it drove us to try and do more. So we we did a lot more than than um we we'd ever planned to in you know supporting what the the family liaison officers who were then appointed to work with the bereaved families. We had I had a team of kind of three um of the public what you call public information officers, three press officers as we call them, who were literally going around speaking to all the the family members to get tributes, to um work out what what they wanted in terms of you know how they were gonna handle the the media and um and even through to funerals and trying to look at how we could manage that it so that it not to tell them what to do, that was never any kind of focus, but to help them navigate it so that what they needed and what they wanted we could try and and facilitate and and help as much as possible. And it became a huge piece of work. Um but for me, I think that was one of the the if there was anything kind of you can be kind of look back and say, yeah, I I was really pleased with that bit. I think that bit was what for us became the the most beneficial element of what we did. Um and that was never part of the plan. Um that was never in the plan. Um, but it it you know, but it for me that's where we should be all the time, really, with these uh with disasters and emergencies. Um that should be where the first thought goes to. Have we supported, do we are we there for the people who are really caught up in this? And then worry about some of the other elements around that. Um and the same goes kind of for internal because from the next day, so that was like overnight, but into the next day, um obviously we've got a huge amount of people who are responding in different ways within the the from the police um service side and dealing with really difficult things. So you've got that whole kind of well being, welfare, emotional support internally as well to can to to deal with um and to be able to start. um to kind of identify and try and put those messages out as quickly as possible, really, because you know some people struggle very quickly and other people it can take well one one of my press officers it took a year really before she admitted that she needed to go and speak to somebody because she of what she dealt with during the incident. So um so yeah that I I think for me that's the most critical part of of anything um that we do really.

Marc Mullen 22:29

Was that understanding um all the way up through the command post itself or was this where you were managing the very human process of dealing with victims and their families while the response was focused on investigations and so on?

Responder Welfare And Personal Aftermath

Amanda Coleman 22:47

Or did you have support all the way up to share whatever was needed in order to help the the human process of identifying and dealing with the loss yeah it it became kind of a a key driver of the strategy um right up to senior level um that we knew we needed to we needed to to help people and do the best we could for the people who were affected and there was like hundreds really when you look at it because obviously there was the 22 people who who tragically um died but then there was many many more that had physical and psychological injuries and a lot of them were were young people as well because of the nature of the concert so so there's a natural kind of that that had to be the the kind of driving force for everything that said there's a big police investigation operation and response but it was always rooted in recognizing what had happened and not losing sight of the emotional distress and and like you say the the all that's the elements that people were having to deal with and that were facing. And even people who weren't necessarily directly connected because Manchester like I said is a bit of a community sort of feel um and you know all my staff lived or had been bought and born and brought up in and around the area you kind of had this personal kind of connection to it. The arena is one of the biggest concert venues everybody virtually had been to it at some point. So there's just so many kind of connectors to it. And again in some respects that's hard but in others it helps really focus you on what matters and focus you on you know just wanting to do the best the challenge for me I think on a personal level was it took me a lot I I I've always felt like we we could we could and particularly I could have done more because you have that sort of survivor feeling where you just think there must have been more we could do there must have been more we could do you can't make it go away you can't make that pain go away for the people who've got that that the the terrible kind of trauma to deal with but you can just try and do what you can to help in some way. And I think it took me a while to really kind of wrestle with that um because it's a difficult thing I think with anybody responding in different ways experiences, isn't it?

Marc Mullen 25:11

Yes.

Tom Mueller 25:13

And that's going to do it for this episode of the leading in a crisis podcast. Thanks for joining us. If you like what you're seeing then please like and subscribe to the podcast and give us a five star rating and tell your friends and colleagues about us as well. We'll see you again for the next episode of the Leading in a crisis podcast